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The Role Of Slippery Slope Arguments In Public 
Policy Debates 
[)a,·id J .  Mayo 
My goal here will be to explore the nature and role of slippery slope arguments in 
public policy debates. I believe their role and rhefr complexity ha\'e been 
underestimated. As a preliminary charncteri:arion, a slippery slope argument i:; 
an argument in practical reasoning which concludes that some intrinsically 
unobjectionable actions, policy or law under consideration must ne\·erchelt!ss � 
resisted, on the grounds that it is apt to lead, through a series of intervening 
steps, to some action, policy or law which is clearly objectionable. Refining this 
preliminary notion will be one of my first tasks. 
Arguments of this description often play a prominent role in debate over 
matters of public policy. In the euthanasia debate, for instance, they have almost 
encirely replaced appeals to the sacredness or the· absolute value of life. They arc 
the primary argument on which the gun lobby relies in opposing even mod�st 
gun control-for instance the so-called "Brady Amendment". They figure 
equally prominently in arguments involving fundamental liberties of speech. 
privacy, and self�determination; it is difficult to imagine an ACLU brief (or a 
court decision which vindicates one) that does not involve allusion to "trends" 
(e.g. "erosion" of rights) or ocher slope allusions. Defenses of the free press 
typically involve appeal to the "chilling effect" of any restrictions on free speech. 
Slope arguments are prominent on both sides of the debate whether more . or 
less. sex education is needed �n public schools. Anyone who becomes attuned ro 
the role of slope arguments in public policy debates begins to spot them every� 
where. 
Yet despite the frequency with which such arguments occur, their rhetorical 
role and impact are often peculiar and paradoxical . On rhe one hand they are 
cypically seen by those who advance them as central reasons for their positions. 
At the same time they usually fail conspicuously to persuade those ar whom they 
are directed-that is, those who are not already convinced. Thus, quite apart 
from whether they are good arguments, in the sense of having true premises 
which genuinely support true conclusions, they fail uniquely co satisfy the key 
rhetorical function of arguments, namely that of helping persuade the previously 
unpersuaded of their conclusions. In fact, "the slippery slope" frequently appears 
among the fallacies discussed in introductory logic books. 
Why do slippery slope arguments figure in this paradoxical way-why are they 
dismissed so glibly by some, while at the same time they figure so centrally in the 
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thinking of others? This is the que5non mouvanng � t:ssav. Before cummg to 
the peculiar role slope argumencs play in public policy debate , howe .. ·er, u will 
be useful to provide a more precise characcenzation of che arguments ac is ue. 
This will be the focus of the next section. Then 1 will look ac che que tion of ci}f 
legitimacy or the philosophic re pectability of slope arguments. Finally. I will tUin 
to the nature of ideologies and their relationship to slope arguments in public 
policy debates. 
Traditionally, commentarors have construed slippery slope arguments broadly, 
and have distinguished between logical and causal forms of slope arguments.1 
On this view, some slopes are said to be logicalfy slippery because acceptance of 
the intrinsicaHy unobjectionable case at the top of the slope is alleged to under. 
cut any logical basis for drawing a line that could prevent the slide culminating 
in acceptance of che clearly objectionable case. (In this vein, "the continuum 
faUacy," sorites-e.g. Aristotle's "bald man paradox"-and even reduccio ad 
absurdum arguments are sometimes construed as slope arguments, or as close 
cousins thereof. On this broad construal, slope arguments are not restricted co 
practical reasoning.) Conttast is thus drawn between logicall-y slippery slopes 
and slopes which are causall1 slippery-that is, slopes with intrinsically 
unobjectionable cases at the top which are nevertheless co be resisted because it 
is believed that, as a matter of fact, accepting chem would cause or lead to 
subsequent acceptance of objectionable cases lower on the slope. An example is 
the causally slippery slope argument against legalizing voluntary active euthana­
sia on the ground chat it would tend to erode respect for life and hence might 
ultimately lead to involuntary active ueuthanasia" of those who are a burden to 
society. 
Against this strategy of viewing public policy slope arguments as a special case 
of some more general category of slope arguments, I propose to take as my point 
of departure the strategy of Frederick Schauer, a legal scholar whose special 
interest is ftrSt amendment law. Schauer2 suggests that clarity can be gained by 
what he calls the method of "analytic isolation"-that is, by highlighting the 
ways in which the slope arguments in which we are interested differ from ocher 
arguments, rather than by concentrating on their similarities. I want, moreover, 
to begin with the substance of Schauer's view, and then suggest ways in which I 
feel it needs to be refined and extended. I want co follow S�hauer also by stating 
at the oucset chat my concern here is not so much with providing a characterua� 
tion of slope arguments which captures all the nuances of "ordinary usage," but 
rather with isolating a kind of argument that is both distinctive, and prominent 
in public policy debates. Schauer and I both recognize we may be using 11slippery 
slope" prescriptively. 
Schauer begins his characterization of slippery slope arguments by observing 
that they involve 11a contrast between a tolerable solution to a problem now 
before us and an intolerable result with respect to some currently hypothetical 
but potentially real state of affairs." (p. 364 ... 5) He then proposes some terminol-
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�· l whh ro pr�sern�. lw calling rhese the "in tnnr case" and the ''danger case" 
re�pecrivelr. He rhen \)bsef\·e:i rhar even the mstant case repre�nts a contraH 
"1ch a m.uu.s quo. That �. 1r rerresenrs a new acnon. I-"Jhc · or law up for 
cons1deramm. 
Schauer next idennfies chree ocher fl.)rms oi argumenr which als) involve 
IJ\Sranc and danger case . but which he belie,·e� d1fft::r imporrantl · from Jo� 
argument proper. The fir t of che ·e, which Schauer refers to as ··arguments 
3Qainst the instant case,'' really appeal w the inrrinsicall · obj�crivnable nature of Q 
the in tam case. ( chauer points ouc "a lope argument is noc needed to claim 
chat censorship of Hamiel or the Democratic Parry L impem1issible." (p. 365)) 
Second, Schauer identifies "arguments from excess breadth": some policies 
are objecrionable, even though they may ha"e satisfying implications in the 
msrant ca e, becau e they directly impl · judgmenc· about other cases that we 
would find objecnonable. Schauer's example here is the argument that lt w1.)uld 
not do for the scare ro prohibit publication of plans for construe ring an H -bomb 
071 rhe grounds th.ac such publicauon could con.sricme a danger to che public, since to 
do so would commit us to the banning of future material which may also 
represent a public danger, but nevertheless should obviously be protected by the 
first amendment, e.g. arguments about the dangers of seatbelts or motorcycle 
belmecs. (Arguments involvmg "appeal co precedenc" seem to be arguments of 
chis type, as are many of chose which ocher commencators would view as 
involving logically slippery slopes.) 
"Arguments from added authority" constitute the third dass of arguments 
Schauer distinguishes from slope argumencs. Argumencs from added authority 
are not about the substance of the decision at hand, but instead challenge: the 
jurisdictional power assumed by the decisionmaker. Schauer suggests an argu­
ment might be made against an appellate court ruling that a 6-person jury is 
sufficient for a criminal trial, not on the grounds that a 6,person jury is unaccept· 
able, nor even on the grounds that a 6-person jury might lead to a 5-person jury, 
but rather on the grounds char any court 
making such a ruling is also i1mplicitly ruling favorably on whether it has the 
authority to decide the size of juries. Analogously, at the time of this writing the 
U.S. Supreme Court has agreed co hear a case involving a lower court ruling that 
property taxes in Kansas City muse be raised to pay for magnet schools in order 
co effect a desegregation plan chat has been stalled. The challenge claims the 
lower court has no authority co tax, since this is a legislative and not a judicial 
function. 
To these three forms of argument, I would add a fourth which also superfi­
cially resembles a slope argument, but whose logic contrasts sharply with it. l am 
chinking of the simple appeal to equity or justice-that is, arguments of the form 
"You mustn't do that, because ... what if everyone did that?'• Sometimes, of 
course, what is behind this question is the straight consequentialist (slope) 
argument that your doing chis will increase the risk of others doing likewise, wirh 
consequences that would be unacceptable. Often, however, such a risk is 
negligible: "You should vote, because ... what if nobody voted?" is a very weak 
consequentualist argument. Construed as an appeaJ ro justice, however, the 
4
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 21 [1990], No. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol21/iss1/1
84 David ). Ma)o 
argument is very powerful : .. le is unJu r of vou co bt:nc:fic from che democranc 
system and at the same ume refuse to undenake che burden which ochc:r_ fr�d\' 
undenake in order co maintain ic." le is a tra1ghrforward case of che fredoader 
argument. 
Having articulated contrasting forms of argument, Schauer proceeJs wnh � 
positive analysis. Slope argumen�. Schauer cla1ms. are characterized by ( I )  
implicit concession that the ms tam case is mtnruically unobjecnonablei and (2) 
a 1conrrascing danger case which is (a) at lease lmgwsucally distinguishable from 
the irlStanc cas.e, (b) held to be rendered more likely by the actualization of the 
instant case, and (c) held co be instrinsically objectionable. Schauer noces chat 
arguments lacking the first condition are really arguments against the instant 
case, and that chose lacking condition 2a are really arguments from excessive 
bread ch. 
Before introducing a refined characterization of slippery slope argumencs, I 
wane to advance severaJ crificisms or refinements of Schauer's view. The first of 
these is char, contra Schauer, arguments from added authority can also satisfy 
boch che condicions characterizing slope argumenrs. To cake Schauer's own 
example: anyone objecting co a court's ruling on the acceptabilicy of 6,person 
juries, is probably doing so precisely because he sees that granting the coun 
auchoricy co rule on jury size increases che risk of che court later permiccing even 
smaller juries which are intrinsically objectionable. Similarly, one can easily 
imagine tax,minded citizens objecting co the judicially determined tax h�ke to 
fund magnet schools, precisely because ic increases the danger of other judicially 
decermined tax hikes which would be objectionable. 
Schauer might, of course, arbitrarily stipulate as a third defining characteristic 
of rrue slope arguments char they not be arguments from added auchoricy. Bue I 
doubt anything useful would be gained by this, for two reasons. First, slope 
arguments involve concerns not abouc just any increased risk of future dangers 
resulting from our present decisions, but only about future dangerous decisions 
which may result from them. Someone is hardly giving a slope argument when 
arguing against driving whUJe drunk on the grounds that it increases the danger 
of an accident. which in rum increases the danger of injury! Schauer clearly (and 
rightly) assumes the slope and danger cases involve future unacceptable decisions. 
Second, whiJe the matter of jurisdiction over any given decision is usually clear 
in me world of Law, it is often considerably less clear in ocher arenas of decision 
making. In fact the uslipperiness'' of some worrisome slopes consists precisely in 
the question of whether, in making a certain decision in the instant case, the 
decision maker is or is not "giving away, authority" in some important respect. 
The harried mother who is tempted co silence her small child by allowing him to 
select a candy bar from the display irritatingly located next to the checkout line 
at the grocery, may be reluctant to do so because she can see this might Lead co 
future troubles, resulting from the child's perception that he has now been 
"given added authority" over selection of supermarket purchases. Somewhat less 
trivially, arguments against the liberalization of abortion laws might be construed 
either as arguments against granting authority to pregnant woman, or as argu, 
mencs about the bad decisions these women might make if granted such 
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·auchomy". Howe"er, for many ann�abomon arguments it U:n'c clear etther thac 
one construal would be more accurate than the ocher, or that anyt hing depends 
00 which way thev are construed. More generally. granting added auchoril)· will 
ordinarily be objectionable only if there is concern about an increased risk ot 
(ucure bad decisions as a result. Thus arguments from added auchoncy ·eem t0 be 
J special kind of slope argument, nor a separate cacegory alcogether. 
I am also skeptical of the hard and fast line Schauer sees between arguments 
from excess breadth and slippery slope arguments. While this distinction is 
usually clear within the law, it is o ften less clear elsewhere. The reason for chis 
uwolves che distinction beC'\\1een an acuon . and the reason for which (or the 
principle in accordance wich which} ic is undertaken. Typically courts do not 
make legal rulings without offering justifications and laying our the reasons for 
what they have done. People. however, can and often do acc. without being 
dear in their own minds about their rationales, and certainly without making 
them clear to others. Thus a coun banning the publication of H,bomb plans 
muse give a reason, and chat reason will clearly have a certain generaliry or 
breadth which embraces future possible cases as well. By contrast, a parem 
caking rime out to help a child wich a school project or co cake him on a scouting 
expedition, may or may not be ''setting a precedent." The grandparent who 
wants to send one grandchild an unusually expensive {but much coveted) 
Christmas gift may well worry abouc setting a precedent for subsequent year:·---1.)r 
grandchildren. Bue these are very murky waters: if there is a precedent, is ic qua 
obfigacion,of,che-grandparent, or qua expeccarion,by,the,child?" Any grandpar· 
enc contemplating such a gift would be well advised to worry about problems this 
may create down the road. I suggest, however, that the grandparent, like the 
philosopher, would be wasting time if she felt it was essential to decide whether 
she was considering an "argument from excess breadth" or a slope argument. 
This same fuzziness also suggests some blurring of the distinction between the 
logical and causa� forms. If an employer who is tempted to improve the working 
conditions of one worker is worried that this may oblige him in f aimess ro do so for 
all, it seems to be a logically slippery slope. If he is concerned ic will merely leaa 
others co expect him to do so, it seems to be a slope which is causally slippery. But 
what would lead them to expect him to do so would almost certainly be that they 
believed he was (in fairness) so obliged. 
With one final but important refinement in Schauer's characterization, 1 
believe we will have identifi.ed all the key elements of the arguments in which we 
are interested. That is chat berween che instant and danger cases d\ere muse be 
intermediate cases. A woman whose husband has repeatedly assaulted her is 
certainly well advised not to go back to him lest he decide to assault her again. 
But we would be reluctant to say that this is a slippery slope argument: it 
involves a "cliff " rather than a slope. 
I believe there is a deeper reason for our reluctance here than just the spatial 
"slope" and "cliff' imagery, and this reason involves a feature of slope arguments 
which becomes especially important to the peculiar way they figure in public 
policy debates. Bearing in mind that the instant and danger cases involve two 
decisions, the slope argument always presumes that those who would be deciding 
6
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the danger ca.se ma� Jo so in a wa\ that would be unwbc and ob1ec.nunaHt m 
rhe pr<:s.enr Judgment •Jf tho e deciding Lhe m cam c�. (\X'irhout lht prt:,ump. 
non cherc would be no nsk.) Th� rre umpnon lS �rounJt:d m the bd1ef chat 
accepcancc of rhe mstanc case would lead m a  gradual wcorrupnon" oi X>mc 
principle, valut: or dcru1on making capac1ry which tho--e v. ho are aJ, ancm� the 
slop<: argument hold dear themsd\'e .5 ( I  wtll return co chi notton of 'corrup­
twn' shonJy.) 
With the� refincmen� m mmJ, we are now m a  posiuon co offer a mor� 
precise characcernanon of slipper\ lope argumencs. The!,. are argumencs which 
cx::cur m practical reasoning, and wh1ch argue agam�c some acnon. pohcr or la\\ 
on rhe ground that tr wtJI increaS<: rhe nsk of a corruption o( good dcci ion 
making; that 1s, mcrea.se the nsk of a seric · of future decision leading ulnmacch 
to Mlmt: inmn.,1caJly obJccuonablc acnon, pohcy or law. Thu they comam che 
followtng demcn�: 
( I )  An "m�tant case" of an acuon, policy or law under con .. 1der­
amm. 
(2) A .. danger case" of an acnon, policy or law which is (a) at 
lea t lingu1 tically d1sunguishable from che mstant case, (b) 
connccrcd wiLh the m�tanc case through a series of inrerme­
diare case (c) held ro be both rendered more likely by the 
actualization of the inseam case, and also intrinsically 
obJecc1onable, and finally 
(3) the claim that because of (2),  ( l )  ought to be resisted. 
The Legitimacy of Slippery Slope Arguments 
Thus characterized, it might appear that slope arguments are deductive argu­
ments, which could be schematized along the following lines: 
( 1 )  l increases rhe risk of D. 
(2) D is objectionable. 
(3) To the extent char D is objectionable, and rendered more 
likely by I ,  I is objectionable. 
However there are several problems with fitting real-life slope arguments onto 
this deductive procrustean bed. In the first place, there seems a bad fit between 
che bold conclusions of most actual slope arguments, and the highly qualified 
conclusion schemarized above, char I is objectionable (only) co the extent that it 
is rendered more likely by D and to the exr.em that D is objectionable. Most actual 
slope arguments urge at lease that, because of the likelihood and objectionable­
ness of D, I should nor be undertaken. In fact many intimate not merely that I 
will increase the risk of D, but more boldly that it will lead to D, plain and 
simple. Should we propose different deductive schemata co accommodate all 
these possibilities? Moreover, this schema represents only part of the argument 
that usually occurs when an actual slope argument is presented. In addition to 
what we have schemacized, reasons providing inductive support will usually be 
given for what is schemarized as the first premise, and probably for the second as 
well. le seems odd to suggest that those aren't really part of "the slope argu-
7
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1Jlent," but rather pan of other inductive arguments to support the premises of 
che deductive slope argumenr. It strikes me that such a move, far from increasing 
in.sight, diminishes it by overlooking the richness and complexity of slope 
arguments. These considerations suggest it might be more plausible to consaue 
slope arguments as, at bortom, inductive arguments. 
I will sidestep this controversy, however, with a terminological proposal: I will 
refer to a slope argumenc as legitimace if all its premises mul iLs conclusion are true, 
and the premises provide grounds for accepting the conclusion. If there were 
agreemenc that slope arguments should be consrrued as deductive arguments, 
che term "sound" would do nicely. This stipulation is needed because there is 
no such agreement, and because there seems to be no uniform usage of a term 
analogous to "sound" for inductive arguments, or which applies to both induc­
tive and deductive arguments. 0 
It is curious that there is no such term, because when people deal with 
arguments in real life , rather than in the context of studying logic, what they 
ultimately care aibout is not whether they are valid or inducth•ely strong or 
cog,ent, but rather whether they are legitimate in the sense I've stipulated. This is 
so regardless of whether the person presenting the argument happens also to be 
che one at whom it is directed (as when I struggle with the arguments for and 
against an issue on which I must take a position} or when the argument is 
presented (as in public policy debates) by one party in an effort to convince 
others. Arguments are tools whose most natural application is in the pursuit of 
auth. With them, we try to convince ourselves or others of certain beliefs, by 
pointing out other beliefs (premises) which seem true. Like any tool, an argu­
ment can be good or bad in the sense that it may or may not facilitate our goal, 
in this case the pursuit of truth. But the logician's interest in how weU an 
mgwnenc supports a conclusion is not the ultimate concern of persons using an 
argument in the usual way in real life. What they are concerned about is 
whether they are legitimate in my sense. (No one would be moved by a strong 
inductive argument in real life if she knew its conclusion was false.) 
Before turning to the central question of the paradoxical disparity between 
how different parties view the legitimacy of particular slope arguments in public 
policy debates, I wish to consider briefly some of what has been said about the 
legitimacy of slope arguments generally. Then I will try to get at some of the 
reasons it can be so difficult to assess the legitimacy of slope arguments in public 
policy debates. 
The general issue of the legitimacy of slope arguments has been dealt with at 
length elsewhere-perhaps most synoptically by David Cole1, who provides a 
good survey and further discussion of the fallaciousness of slope arguments-and 
I make no pretense here at a complete analysis of this issue. However I find it 
remarkable in this literature that informal logicians have been so quick to 
indude slope arguments on Lists of informal fallacies, usually because the risk of 
the instant case resulting in the danger case is often exaggerated.7 This strikes 
me as remarkable because legitimate slope arguments are not only possible, but 
commonplace. A slope argument will be legitimate when in fact the instant case 
significantly increases the risk of the danger case, and when the danger case is 
8
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genuinely objecraonable 1111 a \\a\ thac 1 so ouc of propornon ro cht:! acrra�u' �­
ne s of rhe mstant oise chac at' noc v.orth the n k. We all rouundv recogm:c 
(and, af we are wise and scrong v.,lled, avoid) uch nsb. Oleter are wist: co k"lSl 
the temptation of even JU c one d1ppeJ potato chip, and voum? teenagc::d girl art 
well advised to avmd the (thnlls and) penis of heavy pecung. Moreover, Wt: 
routinely assess the leginmacy of many lope argument wi1Ch grcac confidence: 
warnings about the nsk.s associated with che corrupring properue of cocame 
strilce us as legitimate, whtle chose abouc the ruk of dancing or card planng 
suike most of us as hysterical and unfounded. 
Logicians aren't the only one who have evidenced wholesale skepuc1 m 
about slope arguments: parucular public policy slope arguments are sometime 
dismissed on the general ground chat sumJar arguments could have been 
brought again:sc almo c every b1c of ocial progre· that ha ever occurred, and 
against many pieces of ciennfic progre s as well. Reacuonaries in the Soviet 
Union railed against rhe firbt scagt: of Pensrroika and Glasmo c on the grounds 
char they would lead to further disruptions of the old established order and 
hence ultimately co anarchy. Anci- uffragette exists warned chat if women were 
allowed co vot:e, the next thing you know they would be smoking, working 
outside the home , entering politic , making ocher demands for equal rreacmenr 
and consideration, and generally becoming less submissive and dependenc on 
men. Racists warned that if the slaves were freed all sorts of evils might ensue, 
including the ultimate horror of interracial marriage! Critics of the development 
of birth concrol in the l 920's warned (and the Church continues to warn) that 
such technologies would desrroy the family and "responsible chinking" abouc the 
proper function of human sexuality. 
In the context of criticizing slope argumencs against more Liberal attitudes 
towards euthanasia, Daniel Maguire0 expanded on this point as follows: At the 
heart of many such slope arguments is not merely a conservative mentality, but 
an overly simplistic "taboo" conception of morality. Such a conception sees 
morality as a set of prescriptions co be accepted absolutely and unquestioningly. 
Maguire argued this "taboo" conception failed to do justice to the role of 
morality, especially in a pluralistic, complex and changing world. Maguire held 
that morality is not a fixed set of rules which yields straightforward and consis­
tent prescriptions in any situation, but that ic involves compecing values, which 
responsible moral agents muse learn to weigh and reassess anew in che face of 
ever changing circumstances. Consequently, full moral agency isn't a simple 
matter of "behaving oneselr' and 0following the rules," but of learning how to 
grapple responsibly with conflicting ethical considerations to forge new rules, 
especially when confronted with new and unanticipated si1tuations. Mayo and 
Bennett9 pressed Maguire's analysis one seep further by invoking Kolberg and 
Pecers's theories of stages of moral development. According to Kolberg and 
Peters, the 11taboo0 conception of morality, held by conservative advocates of 
slope arguments was symptomatic of a fairly early stage of moral development; 
anyone who had achieved full moral development would realize morally difficult 
choices were an essential feature of moral life, which consists not of avoiding 
slippery slopes, but of learning co negotiate them responsibly. 
9
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le goe withouu sa)ing that Ma,·o, at lea t .  now reject¥ this wholesale critique 
.f public policy slope argumenc.s a. too -imrhsnc. \X'hile it'- true that irrational 
�ars can be conjured up in connecnon ''ich any ,·enrure. H's also true that che 
rucure is inherently uncercain. and an · compecenr long-cem1 decision making 
,;ll include a careful attempt ro a ess risk . including those uwolving possible 
erosmn or corruption of principles we pre encl · hold dear. Many emironmemal­
!5! argumencs against ,·anous forms of development, arguments against 
legislation creating new loopholes for s�ial incerest groups in the federal tax 
iaw. and arguments against che erosion of first amendment rights all strike me as 
legirimace. Morem·er, as a proponenc of gun conrrol I cerrainly hope che NRA is 
nghc in claiming mac banning imported assault weapons will lead to further 
erosion of the principle that private citizens should be able to buy an keep guns 
as easily as they buy and keep "-alkmans or candy, and co more decisions to 
restrict guns in ocher \\'a)'S as well. More generally. mosc regrettable social or 
palicy crends (e.g. che construction and u e of the fuse nuclear weapons. U.S. 
()ovemment intervention in South Vietnam, lowering of dnnkii.ng ages) had 
their prognosticarors, many of whose unheeded warnings were slope argumenrs 
whose legitimacy is clear enough in retrospect. 
However the phrase "in retrospect" is s ignificant, for it suggests that the 
legitimacy of many public policy slope arguments can be asses·ed with any 
certainty only after the fact. And this is the beginning of an explanation for one 
side of che paradox which we set out to understand, namely char sl()pe arguments 
in public policy debaces so often srrike chose ar whom they are directed as 
completely illegitimate and unpersuasive. The logic of any predictive argument 
will have a rhetorical impact only for chose whom it strikes as legitimate in 
advance. Predictive arguments whose legitimacy can only be assessed reliably 
after the face will be useless, either as good cools of persuasion, or as guides co 
good decision making, which by definition must cake place "before che fact." 
But is such extreme skepticism justified? Can things be as bad as this? Surely 
ir is an overstatement to say chat the legitimacy of public policy slope argmnents 
can never be reliably assessed in advance?  And even if this were so, what would 
then explain the other side of the paradox, namely the cenrrali1ty of slope 
arguments in the thinking of those who offer them? 
Lee us approach these questions by considering a series of slope arguments, 
with an eye to identifying factors that can make assessments of their legitimacy 
difficult. 
Some of the best and simplest slope arguments are those with which wise 
people handle weakness of will. People who know their own weaknesses often 
peer over the edg,e and down the various slopes of irresistible and corrupting 
cemptacions, and decide not to step onto chem and risk descent into decisions 
rhey would later regret. Again, the dieter resists the "just one potato chip/1 the 
recovering alcoholic or reformed smoker avoids "just onen drink or smoke. Most 
of us don't try heroin. These cases involve very saaightforward and plausib�e 
slope arguments, whose legitimacy seems unproblematic. 
In these simple cases the feared corruption is of a brute psychological na� 
rure--0ne foresees that one chip, drink or cigarette would corrupt one's resolve 
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by producing a craving that would provt irre 1�nble. In wmewhac mon: comrh� 
cated cases, the risked danger lie not in a bruce p vchological corrupttvn oi OU! 
will, but in a deeper corrupuon of ont!'s vision of The Good-chat is. o( rhe 
values and princ1ples by which each of u believe he ought ro live, and the � 
of projeccs each of us feels are worth pur)uing. Here a person doe noc fear 
finding himself irresistibly craving something he sciJl knows is bad; rather, he 
fears losing his bearing on what u good and bad. 
Among the most obvious things feared for their power co corrupt in this wav 
are ideas: we sometimes fear being talked into (or out of) something. Consider 
the case of the bright but devout introductory philosophy student who brings a 
spirit of open enquiry to such unthreatening issues as the problem of knowledge 
or the existence of the external world, but whose mind slams shut when the 
topic shifts to the existence of God, because she perceives a risk that whole, 
hearted phiJosophical inquiry may corrupt and undermine her faith in her 
religious tenets. 
Assessment of this sort of slope argument will be much more complicated and 
precarious than that of the previous cases: in addition co uncertainty about the 
slipperiness of the slope, questions also arise concerning the objecrionabiliry of 
the danger case. The danger case may strike the devout srndent as so great ("it 
will mean eternal damnation") that she may decide not to risk it. However r.har 
only speaks to her present assessment of the danger, which may be grounded in 
theological convictions which are simply mistaken. 
It is not difficult to imagine analogous slope arguments in connection with 
those other great corrupters of one's vision of The Good: money, fame and 
power. Assessing such arguments will often be made even more difficult by 
uncertainty, not only over the risk of radical change in one's vision of The Good, 
but over its undesirability. (Often people wiJI avoid discussions of uultimate 
commitrnencs" - including their commitment to their vision of The Good -
because they realize at some level that they are more heavily invested in their 
present commitmenc than is warranted by available evidence. Indeed one 
connotation of "commitment" alludes to the gap between che (relatively strong) 
resolve a person has to some belief or project, and the (relatively weak) evidence 
supporting the wisdom of such resolve. In this sense we speak of commitment to 
a belief as a kind of endorsement we may have to settle for, because we lack good 
evidence for it.) 
All of these cases involve slope arguments people might give themselves. Many 
people, however, spend less time worrying about protecting themselves from 
corrupting influences than they do about protecting others. This is a C'rucial pan 
of parenting, for instance, and can be particularly tricky since on the one hand 
children and young adults typically lack an informed and coherent vision of the 
good (not to mention resolve), but on the other will never develop such a vision 
for themselves if they are subject to paternalistic protection at every turn. 
Imagine for a moment the arguments that might figure on both sides of the 
classic parent-child dispute over piano practice. Imagine a child who has 
expressed interest in learning to play the piano, and whose parents have agreed 
to pay for lessons. on the condition that the child practice daily. Imagine in 
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addinon chat today the child wanes to . kip daih practice and jom friends for a 
cnone. The parent. concerned in anv event that rhe child's dedication to the 
piano may be corrupted bv such temptatii.1ns, refuses pemlission. and presents 
che f11Jllowing slope argument: .. The reason vou musrn 't skip practice today is chat 
if you Jo. ic'll be easier co skip comorrow, and if you start skipping. ·ou 'll ne\"er be 
any good. And you wanr co be ahle t0 play well when ·ou grow up. don't you?" 
There are several replies available co the resourceful child: ( I )  "I just want co 
skip practice clus once-I'll practice comorrow." (There is no slippery slope.) (2) 
"} don't want to be able to play if ic means I ha\'e co practice every day." (Piano 
playing skills are O\'errated-the danger case is nm so objec rionable.) or (la) 
"Being able to play LS important co me, but so are friendships with my class· 
mates." (The "alue of piano skilL are real, but must be kept in perspective in 
light of ocher goods such as enjoying one's childhood and a nom1al social lifo-­
che danger case may be had, buc ic's no worse than other evils connected wilh 
scaying off the slope.) Finally, the child might insisc (3) "I should be free co do 
what I wane, and not be told whac co do all the rime." 
Considerations which were relatively unproblematic in earlier cases make 
evaluation of the parent's slope argument more difficult. ( 1 )  There is the difficult 
question of whether the instant case would in fact lead to future skipped practice 
sessions, as the parent claims. (2) There is also the problem of assessing the "alue 
of piano-playing skills: how is this to be done, and by whom? This will involve 
both more tricky empirical questions (What degree of mastery could the child 
'expect if he perseveres, and what benefits would this yield later in life? WoulJ 
piano playing skiUs, for instance, assure the child a role as "life of chc parry" in 
lacer years?) and also some fundamental value questions co which parent and 
child (or child-tumed-aduJt) may ultimately give different answers. (How 
valuable is aesthetic experience?) 
While technically the hypothetical questions lurking in all this seem co be 
empirical, they may well cum our ro be so wildly hypothetical as co make empiri· 
cal verification a will-o' -the-wisp. They are about possible futures that are not 
only hypothetical now, but aplt to remain so. Moreover these counterfactual 
futures may be woefully underdefined or underspecified. (If the mother prevails, 
is ic because che child was convinced by the parent's argument, or does this 
dispute recur and resentment fester? If Bush's great-great grandchild is a 
compatriot of Gorbichov's will she be Russian?) Wildly hypothetical and wildly 
counterfaccual claims, which are empirical but de facto unverifiable or nearly so, 
figure prominently in slope arguments in public policy debates, as we shall see 
shortly. 
Thus argument between parent and child invites us co envision (at least) rwo 
radically different scenarios. According to che first, the now-grown child shares 
his parents' interest in music, tiooks back with gratitude on his parents' loving 
and persistent interest in his musical development, and is grateful they insisted 
he stick with the piano. According to the second, he bitterly resents having been 
deprived of a normal childhood by domineering parents trying co push their 
interests onto him, stifling his individualism and depriving him of a normal 
carefree childhood in the process. While there may be some reasonably solid 
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inductive evidence for choosmg between them, there lS nothing m che nature of 
the case which say there must be. Which way It goes (or if It is to go either) mav 
well depend on events which netther scenano has taken into accounc. 
Nor is this the end of the problems: (2a) AU lope argument involve noc onlv 
the explicit appeal to some risked danger. but also an implicit appeal to a "base 
line" or alternative scenario, by reference co wluch the danger case ts held co be 
objectionable. This means that an individual's assessmenr of an · slope argument 
requires appeal not just to one hypothetical scenario, but to two-one of which 
muse remain counterfaccual. Whatever the ch.ild might lose (and gains) by 
abandoning piano, it must be weighed against what he gains (and loses) if he 
perseveres. Of course parent and child will probably come up with somewhat 
different pairs of scenarios as they each envision possible alcernarives. Thus the 
argument will probably involve four possible scenarios; both che child's and the 
parent's views of what wiU happen, both if today's lesson is skipped. and if it is 
not. One of these will be difficult co asse s because ic Hes in the actual but 
difficult to foresee future. The other three may be virtually impossible to assess, 
because they lie in the never,never land of underdefined futures which are 
possible bur never actual. 
Even if the probabilicy of each of these (sometimes wildly) conjectural 
hypothetical future scenarios could be assessed, and the elaborate cosc,benefit 
analysis accomplished, there remains the child's final argument (3)-the appeal 
to the value of self,determination or liberty. Mill struggled to ground the case for 
the value of liberty entirely in what he judged to be purely empirical consider, 
ations ( its utility). But while empirical considerations are clearly relevant (we 
know, for instance, that people who are never allowed to decide things for 
themselves suffer because they never develop the ability to do so), even most 
advocates of liberty feel they are not alone sufficient, and welcome alternative 
defenses of the primacy of liberty as a value , from whatever theoretical quarters 
they may come (e.g. metaphysical, political or even theological) . 
If the difficulties of assessing this slope argument are as great as I am suggest, 
ing they are, the philosophically interesting question is no longer whether the 
argument is legitimate, but rather how any parent could fee l  so confident that it 
is. How can the parent feel so sure, both about the slipperiness of the slope and 
that the costs of her son's abandoning the piano outweighs the benefits so clearly 
as to make it undesirable co do so? Parents do, of course, give such arguments, 
and with both good intentions and clear hearts. But in doing so I wish co suggest 
they are not guided by simple empirical beliefs for which they could adduce 
convincing evidence, nor by values seen as brute, ultimate, and beyond debate, 
but rather by an interdependent cluster of empirical, value and perhaps even 
the·oretical commitments. But such a cluster of personal commitments not only 
represents a person's vision of The Good, but also embodies, in miniature, most 
of the elements present in a full-blown political ideology. I believe ideologies are 
what often drive slope arguments within public policy debates. 
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ItJeoLogies and Slippery Slope Arguments 
�'hen we speak of an ideology. we are typically speaking of a c'"'"'mprehensi\'t' 
political program or '-ision. im·olving an amalgam of \'alues, empirical (but often 
";Jdlv h\'pothetical and counterfacrual) and theoretical componencs. The latter 
could be drawn from any discipline. e.g. psychology. soc10logy, political science. 
economics, or even metaphysics or theology. A fuU,blown ideology arriculares 
both a perception of The Good, or how things ought to be. and inrerprerive 
principles for viewing and explaining rhe current social or political reality. 
implicit in the tension between rhe vision an ideolog)' dictates of how chings are. 
and how they ought co be, is both a program for change, and a standard against 
which motion in either direcrion-"progress" or "deterioracion"-may be 
measured. Typically either .. progress" or "regress" for an ideology may take many 
fonns: legislation, court rulings, election or appointment (or even just public 
recognition) of ideological spo!kespersons, policy rulings or institutional endorse, 
ment of every sort and at eveT)· level, and perhaps most important of all. public 
acceptance or rejection of the ideology or policies it endorses. Moreover, rhere is 
an obvious imerplay among all of these: civil righ11:s legislation was passed only 
when sufficienr outrage had been generaced by civil rights accivists over the 
status quo. But the passage of chat legislation has in rum conrribuced co further 
progress on virtually every front I have just mentioned. 
In a pluralistic society, competing ideologies flourish. Classic liberalism, for 
instance, is an ideology which has at its core the primacy of individual liberry. Ir 
dlUs defines a political ideal in which Mill's Harm principle is rigorously re, 
spected, traditional freedoms are given highest priority, coercive intervention in 
che private affairs of individuals by the government (or ocher parties) is vigor, 
ously rescricced, individualism and diversity are encouraged, and confomury for 
its own sake downplayed. le  is in terms of this vision and the ideal that it 
articulates, that the classic liberal both interprets and judges the present political 
reality. A competing vision of The Good is espoused by a family of overlapping 
conservative ideologies. Religious fundamemalist conservatism of the sort 
represented by Jerry Falwell's "Moral Majority," for instance, articulates both a 
political ideal for the government and moral ideals for its citizens, in which 
"Christian values" rather than diversity and indli.vidual liberty play a key role. 1 1  
(Populist and social conservatives share key elements of this vision, even if they 
draw their rationale for it from slightly different quarters.) 
Classic liberal and conservative ideologies both articulate interpretive 
principles for viewing the present reality, but of course on many specific issues 
take diametrically opposed views of what change counts as progress, and what 
counts as deterioration. 
Frequently public policy proposals address issues which very directly violate 
(or conform to) an ideology's view of The Good, and when this happens ideo, 
logues will argue against (or for) them on the grounds of their intrinsic 
offensiveness (or desirability). Thus the fundamentalist ideology yields straight, 
forward arguments against state recognition of homosexual marriage, whereas 
the classic Liberal ideology yields straightforward arguments in favor of them. 
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Often the conflict between public policy proposal and che polmcal ns1on ot 
The Good embedded in an Ldeology wtll be nctther so direct nor so obnou . 
however, and if proposals of this sore offer obvious shore-term benefit chev mav 
experience considerable popularity. Whac I v.'ish co ugge c IS chac at chi ix>im 
slope arguments are the natural response of the person whose ideology is 
threatened. Ac this point, like the dieting mdiv1dual warning himself agamsc the 
perils of the anractive potato chip, or the mother warning her 1 3-year-old 
daughter of the perils of heavy petting, the ideologue will try to sound the 
warning of long-term consequences, by pointing co what he perceives as the 
corruption which this represents, and the further corruption of The Good which 
it invites. 
Slippery slope arguments are the natural vehicles for such long-term warnings. 
Viewed as an isolated incident, prohibiting the Nazi march in Skokie strikes 
mosc people as sensible enough, and viewed as isolated policies, the banning of 
imported assault weapons, or the legalization of euthanasia which is strictly 
active and voluntary, may strike many people as reasonable enough as well. 
However these may not be isolated incidents, in spite of the natural tendency by 
those who favor them to see them as such, and ideologues who see chem as 
embodying movement away from the vision of The Good which they embrace 
will try to call attention to the long-term risks chey envision, by poincing ouc 
what they perceive as the corruption which they represent, and the further 
corruption which they feel they invite. 
Thus far I have spoken only of the conflict between classic liberal and 
conservative ideologies, and while they are at the core of many public policy 
disputes, they are of course not che only ideologies, nor the only ones for which 
slope arguments may function in this way. Moreover, in addition to other full­
blown ideologies, visions of what is desirable that are more restricted in 
scope-e.g. pacifism, environmentalism, feminism, welfare liberalism-may in 
the same way cum naturally to slope arguments against specific public policy 
proposals or developmencs. 
It is entirely possible that ideologues may present slope arguments which 
are-and should be-persuasive. I do not mean ro suggest that slope arguments 
are inevitably either unpersuasive or illegitimate. However both their rhetorical 
effectiveness and their legitimacy are often compromised by the fact that the 
ideologies which drive them often draw much of their strength not from a simple 
demonstrable correspondence with straightforward verifiable empirical claims, 
but instead, art least in part, from their internal coherence. 
Typically, for instance, there will be some degree of implicit circularity 
between the wildly hypothetical empirical and value components of a theory. 
Consider again the case of classic liberalism. For many classic liberals the 
primacy of liberty is grounded largely on the claim that maximal respect for 
liberty will as a matter of fact contribute to overall happiness and human 
flourishing. Even the harshest critic of unbridled permissiveness will admit to the 
merit of some of the empirical claims advanced by Mill and others abou t the 
utility of liberty. Mill was right when he pointed out that often people do know 
their own interests better than others can know them; children never allowed to 
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Jedde rhing$ for chemseh-es v:11l remam children, anJ ix-orle l·cm learn valua�le 
tosons from observing the folk of \)then-. Howien:r there is room for consider· 
ab!e disagreement lxtween men t.'f good \\111 (buc contlicting ideolog1es) ah.)uc 
1ust how highly h�rrv can be exalred on em pineal ground· • uch ns these. At this 
poinr the ideological <lebace mav shift m less srraighrforward empirical claims. 
and eventuaJh· tO wildly councerfaccual claims, e.g. abouc how thmg. would be 
lOT would have been) 1f certain ideals were cons1stench- and lllnt\'ersally observe"!. 
Unforrunatelv the credibilicv one attaches ro such claim. will in cum depend ac 
letbt co some extent on one's preexistent commirmenc co rhe primacv of �i�rry. 
How one reads e\'en mildly lhypochecical facts-and certainlv how \me reads thl' 
";11dly counterfac cual .. faccs"'-will 1c elf tend to be a function of che idenlog1cs to 
"·hich he subscribes, and the values implicir in chem. The circle tlf mutual 
reenforcement of value and empirical,but-difficulr-to�\·erit)· daims i� rhu� 
completed. 
For example:, in the debate O\'er sex education in the schools. each side i:\ 
genuinely convinced of it (wildly?) hypothetical claims about whether more. or 
less, explicit sex education will result in lower teen pregnancy rates. In the 
closely related debate over AIDS education, each ide is genuinely convinceJ of 
ics (wildly?) hypothetical claims about whether the spread of HIV is best slowed 
by educational materials urging absrinence, or by explaining and urging the u e 
of condoms. And in the debate over the legalization of volunrary acti\•e euthana­
sia, each side is convinced of its (wildly?) hypothetical claims about wherher 
more or less compassionate health care would result. 
This tendency cowards irreconcilability of differences between competing 
ideologies is sometimes aggravated even further by the role of even more 
theoretical (e.g. metaphysical, psychological, political, rheological) consider­
ations in the articulation of ideologies. An obvious case in point is the role of 
theological theory in the fundamentalist conservative's ideology. Those \11.1ho 
believe, for instance. that all non�marical sex is contrary to God's will and out of 
step with the "natural order" of things, are more inclined to see human misery a::. 
its inevitable outcome. This naturally colors their inrerprecation of data nn 
various sex·related issues, e.g. whether AIDS education which pre:-1ches absti­
nence is optimally effective for slowing the spread of HIV. Gay activists, on the 
other hand, accept quite different views from fundamentalist conservatives, not 
only about human sexuality (grounded in competing psychological theories).  bur 
also about the place of sex in the Good Life, and about the place of rolcrancc 
and sexual permissiveness in a society which meets their ideal-chat is, a liberal 
society. Disparity about values here not only feeds on (and is fod by) different 
(wildly?) counterfactual commitments, but also by competing theoretical 
commitments in theology, and psychology (co name but rwo) . 
Conclusion 
If I am right in suggesting slippery slope arguments often function in public policy 
debate as the natural response of competing ideologies to developments which 
represent corruption or erosion of their competing visions of the good, scvcrnl 
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puzzling potnts with which we began become mtelligtble. The first of these � the 
prominence of slope arguments in public policy debates. Because •deologie­
aniculate ide.al Vl.Sions, their advoccites naturally new public poliC)· developments 
with an eye co rhe long term, and are inevirably alarmed by dectSions which mav 
initiate or accelerate what they vtew as undesirable trends. However to imply. as 
some informal logicians seem to have done, that all such arguments can be 
dismissed because nearly all slope arguments are fallacious, is eirher co overloolc. 
their centrality in public policy debates, or to talce an extraordinarily skeptical 
view of such debates. 
However l also claimed at the outset that such arguments frequently figure m 
such debates in a paradoxicaJ way, simultaneously figuring ac (or near) the core 
of the rationale of those who are advancing them against some proposed policy , 
and yet often being dismissed out of hand by those at whom they are directed. 'I 
have suggested this is so because they are the surface embodiments of ideological 
conflicts: to those who advance them they represent statements of fundamental 
concerns about perceived threats to the vision of the good which they embrace, 
while those at whom they are directed often do not share that vision, and may 
even embrace a competing ideology according to which the "threatened corrup­
tion,, actually represents desirable progress. 
In addition to the analytic component of my thesis about the nature of 
ideologies and their relation to slope arguments, there is also an empirical 
component. I have claimed that my analysis :fits most occurrences of slope 
arguments in actual public policy debates. For this claim I've given only skimpy 
evidence. Even if more space had been available for me to address this claim, it 
would still remain for the curious reader to observe public policy deba1tes, and to 
determine for herself the extent to which slope arguments actually do figure in 
them as I have suggested they do. 
NOTES 
1 See for example David Lamb, Down the Slippery Slope: Arguing in Applied Ethks 
{New York: Routledge, Chapman and HaU, 1987); James Rachels, The End of Ufe, 
{New Yorlc: Oxford 1986); or David Cole, "On Slippery Slopes" (unpublished, but 
available from David Cole, Department of Philosophy, UMO, Duluth MN 55812.) 
1 Frederick Schauer, "Slippery Slopes," Han.iard Law Review, 99, 1985, pp. 361-383. 
1 Schauer argues thac unless the instant case is incrinsically unobjectionable, a slope 
argument won't be needed, slnce it can be objected co on the basis of irs intrinsic 
objeeitionabillty. This seems mistaken, however. People usuaUy want all the 
argumenrs they can muster, especially when they are warning others against a 
course of acrion which they feel would be a mistake. &hauer is right, of course, 
that a slope argument focuses on derivative objecdonability of l which ultimately 
resides in D. 
4 The murkiness of these waters can hardly be underestimated. As Judith Martin has 
argued persuasively, gifts are by definition not a matter of entitlements and 
obligations. (Sec Judith Martin, Miss Manner's GWdt w Excruciacingl) Correct 
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BeluAttOT. �ew Y rL:.: Atht'.'neum, 19 2. pp. 52 hT.) Yet. .at the same rime. much gilt 
givmg LS embedded m expectaaons \l.foch are so well esrabhshed soc1aHr (e.g. 
wedding gift giving) thac cht'.'v do seem to border on rule.-:. ��r:mng c.lbliganons and 
enotlemenrs. Marnn pb\'fullv. refers m th1. neN rlc. of well esrabhsho:J t:..'q)e'Cta· 
ooru as "excruciaungh· correct lbeha .. 1or · m the ntle of her enquene b<x.'1.:.: .he 
argues that these and other rules of enquerte are essential to a ch'ih:ed i:ociet"', :ind 
rightly sees n as pan of ht'.'r JOO qwa arbner of chese rules co aniculace anJ mcervret 
rhem for those to whom they ewe unclear. Tius point about gtft ginng �xtends to 
ocher social interacaon m which \l.'e ma · be tempted m pronde kmdnesses for 
others-e.g. kindnesses such as mo�;ni an dderly neighbor's lawn. or pron.ding her 
with a ride co the supermarket. Martin captures the murkiness of all this in the lines 
.._.,th which she begins a chapter on presents: '"Presents are never gwen because they 
are felt to be obligatory, but because people enjoy expressing their affection and 
appreciation in a tangible fonn. You chcx>se a present when something catches yow 
eye and suggests itself as a source of delight for a panicular person. When rou 
receive a present, your pleasure in it and in the feelmg ir symboli:.es obliteraces any 
awareness of its material worch. Do you believe this? Miss Manners ts f'f)ing tl.l." (p . 
521.) 
I am indebted t() my colleague. Loren Lomasky, for rhe insight abclUf the n.lle llf 
"'corruption" in slope arguments. 
Howard Kahane. Logic and Philosophy: A Modem lnrroducrion Fifth Edirion (Belmont 
CA: Wadsworth, 1986) speaks of stronger or weaker inductive argumenrs, bur this 
provides an analog to "valid" rather than to "sound." He has also propo.sed "cogent" 
as a blanket term, but defines it in such a way that an inductive argument could � 
cogent even though its conclusion rumed out to be false. An argument which is 
·legitimate in my sense is not only (reasonably) strong and cogent-in :addition, il 
.. has a happy ending." that is, it invoh·es giving reasons for a claim chat cums ou1 to 
be true. And this, after all, is what people are concerned about when they are trying 
to decide whether or not co accept any given argument in real life situations. 
Cole notes that "probably" is intransitive, since the probabiliry of a series of steps is 
multirnplicative, nor addititive. Thus, for instance, if rhe probabiliry of each o( 4 
steps leading co the next is 80%, che probabiliry of the first leading ro the founh is 
only (.80)4 or about 40%. 
Daniel Maguire, Death fry Choice (New York: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 131 · 1 40. 
David Mayo and Marilyn Benneu, "The Role of Burden/Benefit Analysis in the 
Orchesrrarion of Death in the ICU," Stuart Youngner, (ed.) Human Val1res in 
Critical Care Medicine (New York, Praeger; 1986) , pp. 35-62. 
10 I say, "the logic of any argument" because I don't mean to deny that often-all coo 
ofcen-people are persuaded by emorional appeals rather than logical ones. To the 
extent l am concerned about the strength--0r legitimacy--0( arguments, however. I 
am restricting our attention to the human capacity to respond to reason, and 
ignoring the capacity to ignore tic. 
11 lc's significant-and certainly ironic-chat Falwell chose the name Liberry Report for 
the monthly publication of the Moral Majority. 
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